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being that they are incompetent and antiquated. Willoughby, Principals
of Judicial Administration, page 302-306. Some judicial tendency in
this direction is indicated by the decision in Tumey v. State, 273 U.S.
510, 71 L.Ed. 749, 5o A.L.R. 1243, 47 Sup. Ct. 437, 25 O.L.Rep.
236 (1926), where it was held that pecuniary interest in the case dis-
qualifies the justice, as where he gets no fee except in case of conviction.
In view of this sentiment, the interpretation of the Court of Appeals in
the principal case might be justified, as tending to cut down the junsdic-
tion of justices of the peace.
But there is another side to the picture. Although the prosecutor,
under section 13437-34 of the General Code, may go directly to the
Common Pleas court on information, such is not the common practice.
The result is increased expense on the counties for grand juries. An
added burden of litigation is also pla ed directly upon the Common
Pleas courts, perhaps necessitating further delays under the present set-
up. Recent decisions in Ohio have tended to limit the Tumey decision.
Tan v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 57 A.L.R. 284, 159 N.E. 594
(1928), State v. Guyton, 8 Abs. 349 (930), Testa v. State, 8 Abs.
333 (1929).
Without entering this controversy further, suffice it to say that it
seems better to leave it to the legislature to make some decisive change
in our present set-up, which would eliminate the possibility of further
congestion and complications in the courts. It would seem, therefore,
that under the most logical interpretation of sections 13433-9 and
13433-10 of the General Code, final jurisdiction is conferred upon a
justice of the peace where there has been a written waiver of a jury
trial by the accused, although the complaint has been brought by some-
one other than the party injured and there has been a plea of guilty.
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WIDOW'S RIGHT OF DOWER IN PERPETUAL LEASEHOLD ES-
TATE-MERGER OF LEGAL AND EQUITABLE INTERESTS IN
SAME PERSON
In 1913, a trust agreement was entered into between John Swift
and others, the corpus of the trust being a ninety-nine year lease renew-
able forever. Swift later acquired eleven-twelfths of the equitable inter-
ests and the legal title of the former trustee. Such was the situation on
April 23, 1931, at which time Swift assigned the property to H. N.
Ragland for the benefit of creditors, without his wife's release of dower.
An action in partition was commenced May Io, 1931. Swift died Jan-
uary i6, 1932, and his wife sought dower rights in his eleven-twelfths
interest. The court decided that dower of the trustee's wife attached to
his interest because, upon the acquisition of the legal title, the equitable
interest merged with the legal interest making the statutory provision
concerning legal interests apply. Ragland v. First National Bank of
Cincinnati, 48 Ohio App. 441, 194 N.E. 389, 2 Ohio Op. 19, 17 Abs.
104 (1934)-
At common law, a widow was entitled to dower only in lands in
which her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance during cover-
ture. There was no right of dower in perpetual leaseholds as an estate
for whatever number of years was a mere chattel interest. Tiffany,
Real Property (2nd Ed.), Vol. i, page 748 (1920); Spangler v. Stan-
ler, i Md. Ch. 36 (847); Goodwin v. Goodwin, 33 Conn. 314
(1866); Cf. Lenow v. Fones, 48 Ark. 557, 4 S.W. 56 (i886). Some
states have changed the common law rule by enacting statutes, as in
Missouri, where a statute expressly gives dower, as in real estate, in a
leasehold for a term of twenty years or more; if the term is for less,
dower is given as for personal property. Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-
Bell-AYnchor Store Co., 225 Mo. 414, 125 S.W. 486 (i9IO); Phillips
v. Hardenburg, i81 Mo. 463, 8o S.W. 891 (1904). In Ohio, a per-
manent leasehold, is by statute to be treated as real property for certain
purposes. Section 8597 General Code provides, "Permanent leasehold
estates, renewable forever, shall be subject to the same law of descent as
estates in fee are subject to by the provisions of this chapter." However,
early Ohio cases held that although a permanent leasehold estate by
express statutory provision was to be treated as real property for certain
purposes, that did not make it real property for the purpose of dower.
Oliucr v. Jones, 3 Nisi Prius 129, 6 Ohio Dec. 194 (1896); Kamp-
mann v. Schaaf, 8 0. Dec. Rep. 351, 7 Ohio L. J. 159 (1882);
Zbbott v. Bosworth, 7 0. Dec. Rep. 300, 2 Ohio L. J. 92 (1877). In
1925, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston,
n12 Ohio St. 306, 147 N.E. 513, held that a perpetual leasehold is real
property within the meaning of section 86o6 General Code so that a
widow has dower rights therein. This case overruled former Ohiq
decisions on the subject and reached a conclusion contrary to that held
in most other jurisdictions. Spangler v. Stanler, supra; Goodwin v.
Goodwin, supra. The decision in the Ralston case is criticized by Pro-
fessor Lewis M. Simes in 20 Ill. L. Rev. 290 (1925). In the principal
case the court followed the holding of this case and permitted 'dower
rights in a perpetual leasehold.
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The plaintiff-in-error, in the principal case, claimed that Swift had
merely an equitable interest and, since the property had been conveyed
before Swift's death, his widow would be entitled to no dower. The
statutory provision, sought to be applied, provided that in order for
dower to attach to an equitable interest, it must be in the possession of
the husband at the time of his decease. The court decided that by the
terms of the trust agreement, Swift's subsequent acquisition of the
trustee's interests dearly gave him the legal title. As a general proposi-
tion, where the legal and equitable estate in the same land become vested
in the same person, the equitable will merge with the legal interest to the
extent of the equitable interest. Perry, Trusts and Trustees, ( 7 th Ed.),
Vol. I, section 347; Bogart, Trusts, page 258 (1920); Langley v.
Conlan, 212 Mass. 135, 98 N.E. lO64 (1912); Ogden v. Ogden,
6o Ark. 70, 28 S.W. 796 (1894); James v. Morey, Cowen (N.Y.)
246, 14 Am. Dec: 475 (1823). That the above holds true in a situa-
tion involving dower rights to such merged estate has been affirmed in
the following cases: Robison v. Codman, i Sumner's Rep. 121, 2o Fed.
Cas. 1056, No. II, 970 (1931); Hopkinson v. Dumas, 42 N.H. 296
(i86i); Cochrill v. irmstrong, 31 Ark. 58o, 591 (1876). Some
cases hold that estates only merge if equally coextensive or if the legal
estate is more extensive. Donalds v. Plumb, 8 Conn. 453 (1831);
Murray v. Murray, 62 Ind. App. 132, 112 N.E. 835 (1916); Sea-
board Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Holliday, 165 Ga. 200, 140 S.E. 507
(1927); Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho 576, 123 P. 487 (1912). Itis
also sometimes held there will be no merger if the intention is otherwise.
Chase v. Van Meter, I4 o Ind. 321, 39 N.E. 455 (1894); Weidemann
v. Crawford, 158 Ky. 657, 166 S.W. 185 (1914); Milwaukee Loan
and Finance Co. v. Grundt, 207 Wis. 5o6; 242 N.W. 131 (932);
or if it is necessary for the justice of the case that there be no merger.
Warner, Administrator v. York, i O.C.C.N.S. 73, 15 C.D. 31o
(903). Quaere, as to whether these exceptions would apply to cases
involving dower rights.
The property involved in this case was conveyed April 23, 1931.
The action in partition was commenced May IO, 1931, and Swift died
Jan. 16, 1932. As the present dower statute became effective Jan. i,
1932, the interesting question arises as to whether the case was decided
under section 86o6 or 10502-I General Code, the present dower stat-
ute. Apparently the result would have been the same in either case
because under both the old statute and the present one, dower is given
in legal estates conveyed before the death of the husband.
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